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Abstract
24 pages
The economic well-being of economic agents is assumed to be interpersonally dependent.  The extent of this
interpersonal dependency varies according to the strength of relationships, values, and social bonds and is measured
using social capital coefficients in a neoclassical model in which agents with stable preferences maximize utility.
The model's predictions are tested empirically by asking agents how their willingness to bear a risk is altered when
their refusal to accept the risk increases the risk faced by others.
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Most risk studies characterize an agent's decision problem as finding the preferred tradeoff between the risk
and return of the decision maker's own income (Robison and Barry).  The decision problem becomes more complex,
however, if the decision maker's preference function includes the well-being of other agents.  If the agent's response
to risk changes the risk faced by others, then incorporating the well-being of others into the decision maker's
preference function may significantly affect the decision maker's risk response.
When facing risk, decision makers must determine their options for altering either the risk's likelihood or its
outcome.  When alternatives exist for altering either the likelihood or the outcome of a risky situation, decision
makers must determine if the benefits of altering the risk are worth the cost.  Alternatively, if decision makers will
be compensated for bearing the risk, they must determine the risk subsidy required for them to assume the increased
risk and still be as well off as they were before absorbing the additional risk.
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The difficulty of calculating risk subsidies are increased if the well-beings of economic agents are
interpersonally dependent and further complicated if an agent's response to risk alters the risk faced by others.  To
illustrate a more complicated risk problem, consider the decision to purchase life insurance by the principle income
earner in a family.  The decision to purchase life insurance depends in part on the strength of the insured's
relationship to family members.
A second illustration of interpersonally dependent preferences and risks is the decision to apply herbicides
and pesticides.  The application of herbicides and pesticides may reduce a producer's risk of crop failure but
increase the health risk of his or her neighbors.  If the producer's well-being is interpersonally linked to his or her
neighbors, then the neighbors' increased health risk is an important cost consideration in the producer's herbicide
and pesticide application decision.  One implication of the relationship is that the health costs imposed on the
decision maker's neighbor are internalized and may lead to improved efficiency of resource allocation without
imposing external controls on the decision maker.
Economists have long recognized the importance of relationships.  Yet, attempts to model the impact of
relationships on resource allocation have for the most part analyzed the problem under conditions of certainty.2
Because risk and the influence of relationships are present in so many practical decision settings, this paper
attempts to integrate them into one study.
The purpose of this study is to examine changes in an agent's response to risk when the agent's choices alter
the well-being of others.  If relationships are unimportant, then external risk effects resulting from an agent's
response to risk can be ignored.  Under these conditions, the traditional expected utility (EU) model that emphasizes
selfishness of preferences is acceptable.  If, however, relationships are important, then modeling interpersonally
dependent risks should improve our ability to predict and/or explain behavior in risky settings.
In what follows, the literature is reviewed that supports economists' emphasis on self-interest.  Next, the
literature is reviewed that supports the view that relationships modify agents' pursuit of self-interest.  This review
includes a discussion of how social capital can be used to model the influence of relationships on resource
allocation decisions.  After the review of literature, relationships are introduced into the EU model using social
capital coefficients.  The resulting neoclassical model with social capital coefficients modifying preferences is then
tested empirically.  The survey asked respondents how their willingness to bear risk is changed when their choice
alters the risk exposure of another person.  After reporting the results of the study, this paper concludes with a
discussion of the relevance of risk and social capital research and the need to include social capital in agricultural
and natural resource related research.
The Assumption of Self-Interest
The literature supporting neoclassical economists' emphasis on self-interest is well-known.  Edgeworth, a
famous 19th century economist, wrote that:  "The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only
by self-interest" (Rescher).  Mueller added that only the assumption of egoism was essential to a descriptive and
predictive science of human behavior.  Adam Smith (1776) declared:  "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (p. 25).
Summarizing the focus on self-interest, Etzioni wrote:3
"The neoclassical paradigm, we have seen, attempts to show not merely that there is an element of
pleasure (self-interest) in all seemingly altruistic behavior, but that self-interest can explain it all."
Evidence That Relationships Matter
Few would argue that economic agents often act selfishly.  On the other hand, an increasing amount of
evidence supports the view that what an agent considers to be in his or her self-interest is modified by relationships,
social bonds, and values (Swedberg).  As a result, economic agents may be influenced in their choices by how their
choices affect others.  If the influence of relationships exerts a significant effect on an agent's resource allocation
decisions, then there is a need to adjust our traditional economic models to describe the role of relationship to more
realistically describe the decision making process.
Everyday events support the view that relationships alter economic behavior (Schmid and Robison,
Robison and Hanson).  Realtors recognize that the sale price of a particular parcel of land depends on the
relationship between the seller and buyer.  Only "arms-length" sales between unrelated individuals can be used to
reflect the market value of land (Gilliland).  Nepotism laws impose restrictions on close relatives being hired by the
government in the same agency.  These laws recognize the tendency of government employers to grant advantages
to their relatives.  Civil rights laws prevent employment being denied when the basis of the discrimination is race.
These laws recognize that race, a special kind of relationship, sometimes influences employment decisions.
Many persons make significant efforts to return lost items even though they belong to a stranger.  The
reason for such action may be based on a relationship to oneself that requires actions consistent with an internalized
set of values.  This internalized relationship is sometimes referred to as one's conscience.
Those who frequent restaurants nearly always leave tips even when they do not expect to be waited on by
the same server in the future.  One explanation may be that a relationship developed between the customer and the
server during the meal which the customer wishes to strengthen.  Alternatively, the customer may have an
internalized value that requires fairness even when not externally enforced.4
Other groups of people who fail to fit the selfish preference profile include those who vote even when the
outcome is not in doubt and individuals who buy life insurance for beneficiaries from whom no reciprocal action is
expected.  Other individuals frequently exchange gifts without any enforceable contract for a repayment in kind.
The explanation for the gift giving is most often that there exists a special relationship between the gift provider and
the gift recipient, often a neighbor (Webley).
Reviews of articles submitted to many professional journals are conducted anonymously.  Unless
relationships influenced reviews, anonymity in the review process would be unnecessary.  Anonymity, however, is
justified since the evidence indicates relationships do influence the outcomes of the review process (Blank).
Relationships are crucial in the job market.  According to a U.S. Bureau of Labor study, 63.4 percent of
the jobs are a result of informal contacts where the job seekers exercise their own initiative in building on personal
contacts.
Families represent an organization in which special relationships exist.  This special relationship appears to
manifest itself in the formation of business agreements.  Gwilliams found that 89 percent of Michigan farmland
leases were between friends or family.  Between related individuals, farm land leases tend to be oral and more
successful than leases between unrelated lessees and lessors (Johnson et.al.).  Nelton noted that family businesses
account for 76 percent of Oregon's small companies.  Finally, Calonius wrote that 75 percent of U.S. companies are
family-owned or controlled.
Relationships between individuals and causes account for large amounts of voluntary donations.  Despite a
sluggish economy, philanthropic giving across the nation increased in 1991 over 1990 by 6.2 percent to $124.7
billion.  According to the Trust for Philanthropy, the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel's research
arm, 89 percent of the amount contributed was by individuals.  Largest recipients included religious organizations,
$67.6 billion, and education, $13.3 billion.  Other recipients included environmental groups, the arts, health
organizations, and other nonprofit groups providing human services (Tetsch).
Finally, according to a U.S. Census study, 80 million Americans volunteered an average of 4.7 hours per
week in 1987 or 19.5 billion hours.  Unless there can be found a taste for giving away one's money and time,5
billions of dollars worth of economic activity in the U.S. economy is largely unaccounted for by the selfishness of
preference assumption which focuses on promoting one's selfish interests through two-way exchanges.
Frank summarizes the conflict between the assumption of selfish preferences in economics and observed
preferences:
"...Economists, for their part, point with pride to the power of self-interest to explain and predict
behavior, not only in the world of commerce but in networks of personal relationships as well.  And
yet, the plain fact is that many people do not fit the me-first caricature.  They give anonymously to
public television stations and private charities.  They donate bone marrow to strangers with
leukemia.  They endure great trouble and expense to see justice done, even when it will not undo
the original injury.  At great risk to themselves, they pull people from burning buildings, and jump
into icy rivers to rescue people who are about to drown.  Soldiers throw their bodies atop live
grenades to save their comrades.  Seen through the lens of modern self-interest theory, such
behavior is the human equivalent of planets traveling in square orbits."
Evidence also supports the view that relationships matter in the aggregate as well as at the individual level.
For example, special trading patterns often develop between nations that share common cultural, language,
geographic, or other characteristics.  Finally, nations often act to restrict trade when unfavorable relationships exist.
In response to evidence that relationships matter, some economists concede that relationships matter, but
not in important ways.  These economists believe that we can continue business as usual with selfish preferences as
the foundation for our models. (Hirshliefer, Gardner).
It is acknowledged that many important economic transactions may not be affected by relationships.  For
example, in perfectly competitive markets in which many buyers and sellers unknown to each other trade a
standardized good, relationships may not be important.  On the other hand, strong evidence suggests when the buyer
and seller are known to each other, their relationship alters the terms of trade.6
The Altruism Literature
A review of the neoclassical model extensions to account for relationships can be found in Andreoni.  One
extension of the neoclassical model assumes an altruistic agent has a taste for philanthropy.  Characteristic of this
work is Schwartz and Feldstein and Taylor.  A second extension of the self-interested neoclassical model treats the
i
th person's utility as dependent on own consumption of good xi and the j
th person's utility function Uj.  Hence, the i
th
person maximizes Ui=f(xi,Uj).  In this model, the utility of the j
th person is treated as a consumer good that person i
consumes to increase his or her self-interest (Bernheim and Stark).  Recent work by Andreoni combines this
approach with the pure altruism model and develops an "impure altruism" model that accounts for interdependence
of preferences.  A third extension of selfishness of preference approach is the club model.  At the heart of this
approach is the assumption that the desire to belong to the club leads to behavior consistent with the goals of the
club.  Other extensions of the neoclassical model recognize that relationships among family members influence
economic behavior.  Becker's (1981) famous work formalizes some interesting conclusions for family members
whose preferences are interdependent and whose actions have external consequences.  Consistent with the focus on
the family are studies linking altruism to genetic fitness (Samuelson; Dawkins; and Becker (1976)).
Social Capital and the Neoclassical Model
Central to the neoclassical paradigm is the assumption that rational economic agents with stable
preferences maximize their own utility usually defined over their own consumption bundles.  In addition, most
applications of the neoclassical model assume selfishness of preferences (Quirk and Saposnik).  In this paper, the
assumptions that decision makers are rational and maximize their own utility are maintained.  However, in the
model to be defined, utility depends on the income or consumption levels of others whose significance in the utility
function depends on relationships measured by social capital coefficients.  Thus, in the model to be defined,
relationships between agents matter.  This assumption is in the tradition of the altruism work cited earlier but
extends this work by imposing more specific structure on the nature of these relationships.7
The intellectual foundation for the social capital approach adopted in this study can be traced to Adam
Smith (1759).  He recognized the interdependence of preferences when he wrote:
"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives
nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it" (p. 3).
Smith (1759) not only noted that preferences were interpersonally dependent, but that they varied according
to the strength of the relationship.  He wrote:
"Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other
people...After himself, the members of his own family, those who usually live in the same house
with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and sisters, are naturally the objects of his warmest
affection" (p. 321).
To model Smith's insight about the varying strengths of relationships we introduce the concept of social
capital.  Agent i has social capital toward j if a change in j's well-being as perceived by i alters i's well-being.  The
importance for agent i of a change in j's well-being increases with an increase in i's social capital toward agent j.
Social capital has been introduced to agricultural economists by Robison and Schmid (1991, 1994),
Robison and Hanson, and Schmid and Robison.  Coleman has emphasized the importance of social capital in
sociology and Hyden discussed it in a political science setting.  Putnam suggested recently that its supply in the
United States has decreased.
The underlying assumptions of "social capital theory" are:  (1) that the relationships between persons i and
j influence economic choices; and (2) that the strength of relationships vary.  Sociologists have long recognized that
the strength of relationships between individuals varies.  Park considers the concept of "distance" to mean the
grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy that characterize personal and social relations.  Park's social
distance concept appears to combine elements of both relationships and awareness and is included in what we refer
to as social capital.8
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Social capital coefficients Kij are used to model the degree to which person i's well-being is influenced by
the well-being of person j
2.  Person i may develop a relationship towards j of sympathy (Kij>0), antipathy (Kij<0),
or neutrality (Kij=0) (Bogardus).
The i
th person is assumed to maximize the following utility function:
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subject to an upper limit on i's time and resource x.  Variables %i and %j in equation (1) represent i and j's income or
other measures of well-being.  It is assumed that marginal utility is positive for Kii, Kij, Kji, and %i, and from the








Agent  i chooses x to maximize the sum of the marginal utilities of own income, the social capital




















capital coefficient  . -KL
The model described in equation (1) suggests several utility-maximizing opportunities that are ignored in
most neoclassical models.  For example, consider the case where i cannot influence %j significantly.  This may be
the case when j is wealthy compared to i.  Such a wealth relationship might exist between a fan and a famous
entertainer, an alum and the alum's alma mater, or a listener and a public radio station.  In these examples, person i
may still contribute some of his or her resources to j because it increases Kij and thus increases i's utility.  In other
cases agent i may be able to make significant changes in   and receives vicarious satisfaction in the process. %j9
Examples include donations to victims of floods, wars, natural disasters, and members of one’s own family who
may be in need.
In other cases, efforts to increase %i may reduce Kii and Kij.  Examples of social capital reducing activities
include engaging in illegal activities or aggressive personalized competition.  In such cases, an activity that
maintains or increases Kii and Kij may be preferred to one that earns a higher level of %i but lowers Kii and Kij.
When increasing revenue conflicts with maintaining or increasing social capital, trade-offs are required.  (Robison
and Schmid (1994)).
In summary, social capital theory views individuals as capable of vicariously sensing the well-being of
others.  Social capital theory also recognizes that individuals do not experience the well-being of others equally.
This ordering of relationships leaves individuals most sensitive to the well-being of others with whom they are most
alike, with whom they have made commitments and assumed responsibility, or with those with whom they have
significant emotional and social ties.  Finally, social capital theory recognizes that one's relationship to oneself is
important and is positively maintained through actions consistent with an internalized set of values.
Social Capital and the Expected Utility Model (EU)
Implicit in most applications of the EU model is the assumption that only the decision maker's own income
matters.  Moreover, risk coefficient estimation studies typically measure how individuals respond to changes in the
level and likelihood of having their own income altered (Young).  The focus on own income makes the EU model
consistent with the assumption most often applied in the neoclassical economic paradigm; namely, that the identity
of participants in an economic exchange does not affect the outcome (Telser and Higenbotham).
In this section, the EU model is modified to allow relationships to alter an agent's choices when facing risk.
To describe the modified EU model, let %i and %j represent the i
th and j
th agents' deterministic wealth (material and
physical capital), and let Kij measure the social capital agent i has developed towards agent j.  To simplify the
analysis,   and   are assumed constant in our utility expression allowing us to write utility for agent i as -KK -LK
 which is assumed to satisfy the necessary conditions for utility maximization. 7K￿%K￿-KL￿%L￿10
7K %K￿ -KL￿%L ￿ ’K7K D %K￿ ￿%K￿ -KL￿%L (3)
’K7K %K￿ -KL￿D %L ￿ ’K7K D %K￿ ￿%K￿ -KL￿%L (4)
Consider a risk represented by the random variable   and whose expected value is less than or equal to D [
zero,  .  Faced with such a risk, stochastic income for i and j can be expressed as    and  ’￿D [￿￿￿ D %K ￿ %K￿ D [ D %L ￿ %L￿ D [
such that   and  .  Since the risk is, at best, actuarially fair, agent i could only be induced to ’￿D %K￿ ￿%K ’￿D %L￿ ￿%L
accept the risk if his/her salary were subsidized by a deterministic amount   so that expected utility evaluated ￿%i
over the risky outcomes was equal to the utility of his/her previously certain income.  This indifference is described
in equation (3):
In equation (3), Ei is the expectations operator given i's perceptions of the probability of risky outcomes;
and ￿ is the proportion of certain income %i added to i's risky outcome, a risk subsidy that leaves i indifferent
between the compensated risky income and the safe income.  If agent i is risk averse, ￿>0 because the risky income
 has an expected value equal to or lower than the certain income %i.  Meanwhile, the magnitude of ￿ depends on ˜ %i
i's risk attitudes, the distribution of random variable  , deterministic income levels %i and %j, and social capital D [
coefficient Kij. 
The model described thus far is applicable to general risk problems.  However, a specific empirical test can
be developed for a more focused application.  Suppose that agent i may decline the risk or accept it plus a risk
subsidy.  Also, suppose that if agent i refuses to accept the risk, agent j will be required to absorb the risk without
additional compensation.  In this case, %j on the left-hand side of equation (3) is replaced with   reflecting j's ˜ %j
increased risk.  Agent i would now be willing to accept the risk if ￿ is set at a level such that:11
*￿￿ ￿ ]-KL  ￿_ ￿ ￿ ]-KL ￿ ￿_ *C￿ ￿ ]-KL  ￿_ ￿ ￿ ]-KL ￿ ￿_ (5a)
*￿￿ ￿ ]-KL  ￿_ ￿ ￿ ]-KL ￿￿ _ *C￿ ￿ ]-KL  ￿_ ￿ ￿ ]-KL ￿￿ _ (5b)







0’7K D %K￿ ￿%K￿-KL￿%L
0-KL
%K 0’7K D %K￿ ￿%K￿-KL￿%L
0￿
(6)
Because agent j is being subjected to a risky income level   which has a smaller expected value than the certain ˜ %j
income %j, ￿, in equation (3) is less than (equal to) (greater than) ￿ in equation (4) when Kij >(=)(<)0.  This result
leads to the following testable hypothesis applied to equation (4): 
where the   indicates the value of   conditional upon the term in parentheses.  The implication is that the level ￿ ]￿_ ￿
of compensation required by agent i to accept the risk will be less (more) when agent j is a friend (enemy) than
when there is no relationship between agent i and agent j.
One might infer that increasing Kij must lead to increases in ￿.  Totally differentiating equation (4) with
respect to Kij and ￿ results in the expression:
The denominator in equation (6) is positive because of positive marginal utility.  Unfortunately, the numerator
cannot be signed without specifying how increasing Kij changes the risk attitudes of agent i.  Thus, unambiguous
changes in   described in equation (4) occur only when Kij changes sign; i.e.,   increases when   changes from ￿￿ -KL
negative or zero to positive.12
The Survey
To test the statistical significance of the social capital dependent hypotheses developed in this paper, a
survey was sent to 95 graduate students enrolled in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Michigan State
University.  Sixty-six of the students returned usable surveys.  The survey was designed to measure how
relationships affected the students willingness to bear a catastrophic risk.
A catastrophic risk is an event with significant downside risk which is sometimes irreversible.  Examples of
catastrophic risks faced by those employed in agriculture include: farm accidents, fires, destruction of crops as a
result of extreme weather or insect infestation, or loss of livestock from extreme weather or disease.  Other
catastrophic risks may include long-term illness or disability of the farm operator, costly litigation, death of
important farm organization members, and hostility resulting from divorce with farm families.
The catastrophic risk the respondents were asked to consider was the possibility of a car accident.  The
respondents were asked to consider an existing work environment in which driving was not required.  Then they
were asked to consider a request from their employer to assume duties that required them to drive and which
increased their likelihood of being involved in a car accident.  Most of the respondents surveyed had work
experience in which a driving assignment was a possibility.
Respondents were asked: what percentage increase in base salary, a risk subsidy, would be required for
them to be as well off with the driving assignment as they were without the assignment?  Then the respondents were
informed that if they refused the driving assignment that j, defined as either a close friend, a stranger, or an
unpleasant co-worker, would be required to accept the assignment and without additional compensation.  The intent
of this question was to test the hypothesis that varying the sign of Kij would produce changes in   consistent with ￿
hypotheses (5a), (5b), and (5c).
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The results of the survey are summarized in Table 1.  Columns (1) and (2) report average values of ￿ for
the survey respondents.  The difference between columns (1) and (2) reflects differences in the probability of being
involved in a fatal accident.  Column (1) reflects the response to risk when the probability of a fatal accident was
.01 percent.  Column (2) reflects the response to risk when the probability of a fatal accident was .001 percent.13





Risk Choices (1)   (2)
Refusal leaves uncompensated risk to
   close friend ￿￿ ]-KL  ￿_￿
8.4 7.5
Refusal leaves uncompensated risk
   to stranger ￿￿ ]-KL ￿ ￿_￿
11.7 11.1
Refusal leaves uncompensated risk to
   unpleasant co-worker ￿￿ ]-KL ￿ ￿_￿
13.2 13.0
If refusal to accept the driving assignment meant that a stranger must accept the risk, the average level of
risk subsidy required was 11.7 percent and 11.1 percent of certain income for the 0.01 percent and 0.001 percent
risk levels, respectively.  If refusal meant a close friend must accept the driving assignment, the average risk
subsidy required dropped to 8.4 percent and 7.5 percent of certain income for the 0.01 percent and 0.001 percent
risk levels respectively.  Finally, if refusal meant that an unpleasant co-worker would be required to accept the risk,
the average risk subsidy increased to 13.2 percent and 13.0 percent of certain income depending on the probability
of an accident.
The direction of change in the risk subsidy levels is consistent with hypotheses (5a), (5b), and (5c).  When
refusal means a close friend (unpleasant co-worker) will be required to accept the risky assignment, the level of
compensation required to accept risk is lower (higher) than if refusal means a stranger will be required to accept the
assignment.
To test for the statistical significance of the differences in the average risk subsidy levels, a small sample t-
test was conducted for each pair of means for each risk level (McClave and Benson).  The results confirm
hypothesis (5b) that  , suggesting that when refusing the driving assignment meant that ￿ ]-KL  ￿_ ￿ ￿ ]-KL ￿￿ _
a close friend would be required to accept the assignment the risk subsidy was less than when refusal meant that an14
unpleasant co-worker must take the assignment.  The results provide some support for the notion that external
consequences impact the compensation level required for accepting the risk.
The remaining tests found no statistically significant differences between the mean levels as suggested by
hypotheses (5a) and (5c).  The inability to detect statistically significant results in support of hypotheses (5a) and
(5c) may be the result of respondent differences in factors such as driving experience, or perhaps the respondent's
gender.  To help eliminate these sources of variability and isolate the differences in compensation levels required to
transfer risk, the survey asked the respondents' about their driving skills,  miles normally driven per year, the
amount of life insurance carried, and gender.
The impact of respondent characteristics on compensation levels was analyzed using tobit regression, a
procedure that allows for the analysis of bounded continuous variables (Green).  Tobit was the appropriate analysis
since compensation level responses (￿) were bounded below by zero and above by 25 percent.  The model regressed
the level of risk subsidy on respondents' driving experience, amount of life insurance, gender, risk level, and the
relationship with the person to whom the risk would be transferred.  The results of the tobit regression are reported
in Table 2.
The constant term in Table 2 measures the amount of compensation a respondent would require to accept
the driving assignment and be indifferent to employment without the assignment under the following conditions:
(1) if the risk of a fatal accident were .01 percent; (2) if a  stranger were required to absorb the risk if the
respondent refused; (3) if the respondent carries zero to small amounts of life insurance; and (4) if the respondent
were female.
The other coefficients in Table 2 measured adjustments to the constant term or base case.  For example, the
risk coefficient in Table 2 indicates that the compensation level recorded by the constant term will fall by .86
percent if risk is reduced from .01 to .001 percent, although the statistical significance of the estimate is
questionable.15
Table 2. Tobit Analysis of Characteristics Explaining Respondents' Responses to Risk.
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 2-Tail Sign.
Constant 11.62 15.51 .00
Risk (.001=1) -0.86 -1.48 .14
Miles driven per year -0.0002 -5.51 .00
Sex (male=1) -3.20 -5.19 .00
Large amount of life insurance -6.03 -3.66 .00
Close friend -3.11 -4.19 .00
Unpleasant coworker 0.66 0.85 .39
The close friend coefficient measured the change in compensation required for indifference if the risk were
passed on to a close friend instead of a stranger.  Under this assumption, the compensation required for indifference
decreases by 3.11 percent from that required if the stranger were to assume the risk.  If an unpleasant co-worker,
instead of a stranger, were required to assume the risk if refused by the respondent, the required compensation
increases an average of .66 percent over the base case.  However, the unpleasant coworker coefficient is not
statistically significant.  These results support both hypotheses (5a) and (5b).  Hypothesis (5c) is not supported by
the data, perhaps because of the possible reduction in Kii associated with increasing the risk for another individual
even if he/she is unpleasant at work.
Other statistically significant variables that help explain the level of compensation required for indifference
include miles driven per year, life insurance coverage, and the respondent’s gender.  The more miles driven per
year, the less compensation was required.  This result suggests that persons who drive more view the risk of driving
as less significant than those who drive fewer miles.  Those who carried small or zero amounts of life insurance
required greater levels of compensation than those who carried large amounts of life insurance.  Finally, males
required on average 3.20 percent lower percentage increases in salary than did females.16
Conclusions
In this study the impacts of relationships on risk responses have been examined.  To test the importance of
relationships, the neoclassical model was extended by introducing relationships into the model using social capital
coefficients.  Allowing relationships into the model produced additional behavioral motivations beyond those
included in the traditional neoclassical model which focuses solely on own income.  A simplified version of the
model was then used to generate several hypotheses describing how relationships influence the willingness of
economic agents to accept risk.
Empirical results generated from survey data provide support for the hypothesis that relationships alter risk
responses; an individual's willingness to bear risk and to impose risk costs on others does appear to depend on
relationships.  The agricultural economic implications of this study are significant.  The results suggest that the use
of potentially harmful pesticides will be reduced if those affected are related to or have friendly relations with the
producer.  The results suggest that the willingness to bear unpleasant odors increases if the odors originate from a
family member's farm.  The results also suggest that monitoring costs are influenced by the consistency between the
regulation to be enforced and the values of the person expected to obey the regulation.  Finally, the results of this
study suggest that responses to risk must be examined in a broader context than has been used in the past; one in
which relationships and external consequences are included in the decision model.
Most of our agricultural policies are designed as though economic agents act independently and selfishly.
This assumption leads to the view that farmers and others can be motivated to alter the use of potentially harmful
herbicides, pesticides, and hormone growth stimulators or other activities that may increase risks for others only by
threat of litigation or income incentives.  Social capital theory suggests there may be other important motives to
which farmers respond.  In addition, citizens may have social capital developed toward farmland and other natural
resources that leads to socially desirable behavior without any external threats or subsidies.  These social capital
ties may lead some farmers to act as responsible stewards of their resources without outside intervention.
Understanding the interdependence of social relationships and economic decision making may help in explaining
economic behavior and lead to more enlightened policy decisions especially related to the management of risk.17
ENDNOTES
1. In contrast to a risk subsidy, a risk premium is that dollar amount subtracted from the decision maker's
mean income which, if received with certainty, is equal to the expected utility of the risky outcome.
2. Although not emphasized in this paper, social capital can develop between an individual and impersonal
objects such as animals, pictures, one's alma mater, and the environment.  Social capital that develops
between individuals and impersonal objects may result from personal relationships that endow impersonal
objects with social capital qualities.  Social capital is often symmetrically held between persons but is not
symmetric when the object of social capital is not a person.
3. The model can be extended to social capital toward more than one other person by adding the appropriate
social capital coefficients and well-being attributes.
4. The reliability of survey responses to hypothetical questions continues to be debated with no clear
resolution.  Social psychologists argue that hypothetical choices predict behavior best when the choice
context is familiar and specific (Ajzen and Fishbein).
Perhaps the most extensive test of hypothetical versus actual choices is that reported in Fox et al.  They
first elicited hypothetical responses to various choices involving food safety.  They compared these
hypothetical responses to choices in which subjects realized their choices.  They found after repeated trials
that actual and hypothetical responses were nearly equal or that bias in hypothetical responses could be
calibrated.  Their work supports the view that under certain conditions hypothetical responses can be
trusted to reflect actual behavior.
In the study reported in this paper, survey questions were designed to match those conditions required for
hypothetical response reliability.  The respondents were asked to give responses to specific risks with which
they were familiar.
There is, however, another defense of the contingent valuation approach that utilizes responses to
hypothetical questions.  It is that even when actual outcomes occur in response to an agent's choice, the
choice is still made under hypothetical conditions.  What the subject is required to do is to imagine the
conditions that will result from his or her choice and decide on an action before the actual outcomes
resulting from the choice.  Thus, for both hypothetical and actual choice settings, the decision is made
without the subject experiencing the actual outcome.18
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